In Theory: The Jury as a Microcosm

Friday October 26 –

Just like a parent must determine how to allow a child independence without enabling them to engage in self-destructive activities, a democratic government is charged with simultaneously governing and being governed by its constituents. As a crucial part of this body, the justice system was framed with conflicting goals – to protect the people from themselves, (by creating laws that could be strictly enforced enough to achieve that goal) while also considering the rights of the accused and assuring that the innocent are not unjustly treated. To do this, the governing institution must be distant enough from the people that they can be governed by it and it can be a constant assurance to them but also close enough so that it doesn’t overpower them. In general, the justice system must be conducted with rules that are constant enough to treat similar crimes and similar criminals in a similar manner but also must be fluid enough to still reflect the values of the people which it governs. One of the institutions utilized in order to achieve those goals with fluidity fits it quite perfectly in theory – the jury.

While a jury of one’s peers is a conglomerate representative of evolving values within modern society, they are also instructed about the guidelines for conviction regarding the crime which they will judge. The hope is that they are counseled enough to be able to apply the law fairly and justly according to its rigid standards but not faithful enough to it, as a judge or lawyer may be, that they must do so blind of evolving standards. In order words, they are there in theory to maintain the law as it is unless of course it no longer serves its purpose (jury nullification).

In practice however, the use of a jury has proven to be, put lightly, problematic. Various research studies conducted since the 1970s using post trial juries and mock juries indicate that they often miscomprehend instructions they are given, tend to be more highly influenced by the opinions of certain members of the group, like upper-class men, can be subject to jury tampering, and may hold certain biases that affect their deliberations in an inherent manner. More recent studies suggest that improving the instructions given to juries can reduce the first problem but the others are difficult to reduce unless the jury is as informed and knowledgeable about the law as any practicing it as a profession.

Though the debate around juries often involves contradictory reasons for its inadequateness (such as simultaneously declaring that juries have decided a verdict after introductory statements as well as decide based on the opinion of upper-class jury members or the foreman), the simple fact that research can indicate any number of reasons for a jury to reach a verdict that has little to do with evidence seems to be an indicator that juries simply live up to expectations. Following trials in which a jury has clearly decided a case merely on instinct about the nature of the defendants' personalities (such as the Robin Hood Hills case) or even on the racist tendencies of a witness (such as the OJ Simpson trial), one has to wonder if the justice system might be better off relying on the judgment call of an elected gavel bearer. Have we had it wrong all along?